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INTRODUCTION
Robots have become a big issue in the twenty-first century, not least in elderly assistance. There
are hopes that robots will make aged-care jobs less demanding, for example, they could help senior
citizensmaintain a longer independent life in their own home, assist caregivers in the nursing home,
or provide company to the lonely. However, there are different opinions about the use of robots in
our society.
In 2012, a survey was conducted in 27 EU countries to examine the public’s attitudes toward
robots (Special Eurobarometer 382).1 More than 26.000 European citizens responded about the
areas where they believe robots should be used as a priority or banned. The survey indicated that,
in general, less than one-fourth (23%) of Europeans have a negative opinion of robots. But when
asked about the areas in which robots should be banned, more than half (60%) of the respondents
stated that the use of robots should be banned in the care of children, elderly, and the disabled.
Given these figures, little acceptance can be expected currently for robots in aged care.
Nevertheless, the demographic change in developed countries places ever increasing challenges
on the care and support of the elderly. Due to a higher life expectancy and declining birth rates,
the proportion of older people compared to the younger ones increases and with it the number of
people in need of care. For instance in Germany, 30 years ahead, predictions are that the number
of 80 year old citizens will be larger than the next generation of 50 year olds that could support
them.2 One possible solution considered to meet these challenges is that the use of robots in aged
care could help to fill the gap.
ROBOTS AS SUBSTITUTE FOR HUMAN CARE?
More than three decades ago, Feigenbaum and McCorduck (1983) put forward their vision of a
geriatric robot: “It doesn’t just bathe you and feed you and wheel you out into the sun when you
crave fresh air and a change of scene, though of course it does all those things. The very best thing
about the geriatric robot is that it listens. ‘Tell me again,’ it says, ‘about how wonderful/dreadful
your children are to you. Tell me again that fascinating tale of the coup of ’63. Tell me again...’ And
it means it.” (Feigenbaum and McCorduck, 1983, p. 93).
When I read this back then, I was appalled. Would it be ethical to fob off old persons with a
robot? And would such a robot ever become reality? Thirty years later, there are robots developed
for the daily care activities of persons, like lifting, bathing or feeding, including ethical reflection
from the care ethics tradition (Van Wynsberghe, 2013). There are also robots or artificial agents
that appear able to engage in conversation with people and keep track of personal information
(Mattar and Wachsmuth, 2014; Ng et al., 2017) or that can simulate and trigger empathy in their
interactions with humans (Paiva et al., 2017).
1https://data.europa.eu/euodp/data/dataset/S1044_77_1_EBS382
2https://www.destatis.de/bevoelkerungspyramide/
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Some years ago, I ran an ethics journal club3, one issue
being how needy old people could be supported by robots.
In one session, we discussed two papers, one by Sparrow and
Sparrow (2006), who conclude that the use of robots to provide
emotional care and companionship to lonely older people would
be unethical because of the deceit involved: Making people
believe that a robot is something with which they could have a
relationship would delude them about the robot’s capacities and
thus deny their human dignity. In the other paper, by Sharkey and
Sharkey (2011), the authors discuss whether the responsiveness of
interactive robots to social cues may give the illusion of sentience
and thus be deceptive. Yet they suggest that this should not mean
to conclude that all such attempts are unethical. They discuss
evidence from a variety of studies that elderly people’s well-being
may benefit from interacting with a robot—even when observers
of an old person imagining to have a relationship with a robot
might view it as depriving them of dignity.
“Couldn’t this be accepted,” one of us said, “when the old
person feels good with it?” Then, a dispute began between two
students. The first one said, very aroused: “An ever so human-like
robot cannot give true caring.4 That is deceptive and unethical.”
The other student replied: “Would that really be so bad? We
humans like to be deceived, for instance in an exciting movie.”
Again, the first one: “But it is something else if one allows oneself
to be deceived or if one deceives someone else!”—“And what if
there were one day robots like me?,” I finally asked. Robots like
me, that would be: sentient beings; intelligent, autonomous, able
to communicate; self-aware and empathetic; acting consciously
and intentionally.
In Wachsmuth (2008) I examined the question of how to
configure an artificial agent so as to enable the agent to adopt a
first-person perspective and develop some kind of consciousness
and self-identity. My example was “Max,” a humanoid agent
embodied in virtual reality that as such can have at most
simulated experiences, intentions, emotions, etc. Yet as long
an artificial agent does not possess a neurophysiological basis
required for qualitative experience, I argued, it could not have
consciousness of the phenomenal quality of experience like a
human being: For instance, its emotional states can not be
subjectively experienced by the agent, whereas a mechanism of
(simulated) appraisal analogous to feelings could technically be
achieved.
Now, building a “robot like me” would encompass the attempt
of not only simulating, but actually creating conscious experience
in an artificial system. Metzinger (2013) makes a strong case
against bringing a self-conscious robot into existence by pointing
out that such attempts are likely to raise ethical problems because
they would very probably lead to conscious suffering. Even
though the phenomenal qualities of (future) advanced robotic
systems may differ from those human beings have, he argues,
they might for instance be able to feel sensory pain as their
own pain if have a first-person perspective. Thus he pleads, cf.
his principle of “negative synthetic phenomenology,” that “We
should not deliberately create or even risk the emergence of
3https://www.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de/ags/wbski/JC_Ethik_SS14.pdf
4in German: echte Zuwendung
conscious suffering in artificial or postbiotic5 agents, unless we
have good reasons to do so.” (Metzinger, 2013, p. 265). One
could argue that suffering is part of the human condition and
that “robots like me” (able to consciously suffer) may be more
empathetic caregivers responding to the emotional needs of a
person than a being without conscious experience. But as such
robots do not exist as of now (while the care crisis is real), this
point is not relevant for my argument in what follows.
MUST CARING BE “TRUE” TO PROMOTE
THE WELL-BEING OF ELDERLY?
Objectives of aged care include to promote the well-being (health,
happiness) of the elderly. True caring6 would involve, at least,
conscious experience. In this section I want to argue that it may
be sufficient for robots to take part in caring when they behave
as if they care, i.e., give the illusion that they respond to the
feelings and the suffering of their care recipients. By “robots,”
here, I refer to a variety of robotic systems specifically designed
to assist, or provide companionship to, elderly people (care
robots, companions), including autonomous robots that interact
and communicate with humans (so-called social robots). If we
acknowledge that robots for the time being have no conscious
experience resp. (Metzinger’s case) should not have it, a robot
cannot be a “true” caregiver.
Now, must caring be true to promote a care recipient’s well-
being? This is not always the case in human caring either.
Certainly, doctors and nurses alike, as human beings having true
experience and emotions, are able to give true care. But they also
need to be able to protect themselves from emotional distress in
their professional action. In fact, doctors may learn to remain
emotionally detached from the suffering of the patient and still
engage with their patients’ situation (Kerasidou and Horn, 2016),
or nurses need to be able to regulate their emotions to preserve a
professional distance toward patients (Cecil and Glass, 2015).
Emotional engagement in care is a complex issue. Human
caregivers can manifest a variable range of emotional
involvement in response to a need or difficulty of the elderly.
For a robot (based on current technology) this still seems
very difficult to do. Nevertheless, a robot that behaves as if it
cares7 may, in my view, be somewhat compared to a doctor or
nurse that refrain from emotional involvement as part of their
professional action. It would be unclear (not least for a person
suffering from dementia) whether a robot truly experiences or
just simulates emotions. Yet the same seems to be the case in our
encounters with human beings. Their emotions (or conscious
states, or intentions) are not directly observable to us but need
to be inferred; we can only judge from what we experience in
interaction with others.
5By “postbiotic,” Metzinger refers to cases of self-conscious systems which may
be neither exclusively biological nor exclusively artificial, yet artificial subjects of
experience (somewhat like what I mean by saying “robots like me”).
6The term “true caring” is used informally here to emphasize that human caring
includes being able to understand and respond to the feelings and suffering of
others, which I believe cannot go without consciousness.
7“cares” in the sense of responding to care recipients’ emotional needs, whether in
providing companionship or in care activities like feeding.
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Is it ethical, then, to use robots in elder care? The ethical issues
discussed above are deception and dignity. From an empirical
perspective, these concerns might be mitigated, when there is
evidence that those concerned or potentially concerned do not
really seem affected by them. In fact some of us are likely
to accept, or even prefer, a care robot’s assistance, when our
independence is at risk. Here are some sentiments I heard myself:
“I would, in old age, rather have a robot help me to get dressed
than show myself naked in front of a nurse.” Or (a 75 year old):
“I might prefer a feeding robot over a nurse since I would be in
control when the spoon comes and not depend on the caregiver.”
Or: “I would not be a burden on a robot.” This is also a matter of
dignity. In her last year my old aunt—she was 92 years old—got
bedridden in the nursing home and had to wear diapers. On the
phone she said to me: “Now they took my dignity, I have to wait
to get my diapers changed.” This won’t be a solitary case—on the
contrary, it concerns the suffering of many people. Would then
a care robot take away dignity from the aged person or, on the
contrary, help to maintain her dignity and independence?
While such empirical evidence remains to be further
substantiated, we also have to see that the currently young ones
who grew up with modern technology would probably be more
likely to accept robots when old than the current generation of
old ones. If only a portion (say, half) of the needy would be
happy with a robot, the elderly care crisis might be considerably
mitigated. Finally, when we speak about using robots in elder
care this should not mean to say that human care would be fully
substituted by robots. Care robots would normally be employed
under the supervision of caregivers. It goes without saying that
most of us would enjoy the company of a living being in old
age. But when human care is sparse, robots could assist the
needy, or serve as companions in the many hours of loneliness.
A geriatric nurse told me: “Care robots don’t substitute for the
human being—they help when no one else is there to help.”
CONCLUSION
In this paper I addressed the issue of whether robots could
substitute for human care, given the challenges in aged care
induced by the demographic change. Looking at the question
whether caring must be true at all to promote a care recipient’s
well-being, I gave some indication that this is not always the
case in human caring either. I argued that ethical issues like
deception and dignity might be mitigated by evidence that those
concerned or potentially concerned do not really seem affected
by them. In conclusion, it is my opinion that, while robots
don’t appear to be able to give true caring in the foreseeable
future, it may be sufficient for robots to take part in caring
when they behave as if they care, that is, give the illusion that
they respond to the feelings and the suffering of their care
recipients.
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